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PIERCING THE VEIL IN CALIFORNIA LLCS:
ADDING SURPRISE TO THE VENTURE
CAPITALIST EQUATION
Eric W. Shu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Venture capitalists diversify their portfolios in order to
protect the overall investment.1 The theory behind this prac-
tice is that even if several of the portfolio companies squander
all of the capital contributed to them, one or more of the other
funded companies may produce profits that far exceed the ag-
gregate loss from the unsuccessful companies, thus making
the overall venture worthwhile.2 Each company invested in
by venture capitalists has the potential to achieve this kind of
success.3 Now suppose each company in the portfolio also had
the ability to cause liability that exceeds the contribution
made to it, destroying the venture capitalist's entire fund.
This is the type of damage that the doctrine of veil-piercing
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law;.B.S. Biochemistry, University of California at
Los Angeles.
1. See THOMAS M. DOERFLINGER & JACK L. RIVKIN, RISK AND REWARD:
VENTURE CAPITAL & THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S GREAT INDUSTRIES 25 (1987).
Some commentators state that venture capitalists do not diversify; they instead
specialize by investing heavily in one sector of the market. MARK VAN
OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING: MATCHING START-UP
FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES-THE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS,
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 206 (2000). The term "di-
versify," as used in this comment, however, refers to the number of companies
invested in, not the breadth of the market covered.
2. See RUTHANN QUINDLEN, CONFESSIONS OF A VENTURE CAPITALIST:
INSIDE THE HIGH-STAKES WORLD OF START-UP FINANCING 21 (2000); ROBERT J.
KUNZE, NOTHING VENTURED: THE PERILS AND PAYOFFS OF THE GREAT
AMERICAN VENTURE CAPITAL GAME 2 (1990).
3. See National Venture Capital Association, The Venture Capital Indus-
try-An Overview, at http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
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can bring to the field of venture capitalism.4
This possibility is a particularly pertinent problem in
California, an area speckled with high-tech and biotech busi-
nesses that have enjoyed heavy venture capital outlays.5 Be-
sides serving as high-yield investments for venture capital
investors, venture-backed businesses have accounted for
thousands of jobs in California alone6 and have brought many
new innovative high-tech products to society.7 Although Cali-
fornia has shared in the venture capitalists' success,8 it has
unintentionally discouraged venture capital investment into
small businesses.9  This is ironic because California at-
tempted to foster the formation of these businesses by enact-
ing the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company ("LLC")
Act," which allows California businesses to organize as a lim-
ited liability company entity.1' Unfortunately, that Act im-
ports the common-law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
into LLC law."2 This doctrine discourages investments into
venture capital funds. 3
This comment advocates the elimination of the veil-
piercing doctrine from California LLC jurisprudence, and
cites its impact on venture capital financing and on small
business growth as two of the many reasons to eliminate it. 
4
4. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Biotechnology: Business Organization Issues,
32 McGEORGE L. REV. 237, 252 (2000) (suggesting that tort victims of biotech
start-ups might seek to hold venture capitalist financers liable through the doc-
trine of veil-piercing).
5. See infra Part II.D.
6. See National Venture Capital Association, Three Decades of Venture
Capital Investment Yields 7.6 Million Jobs and $1.3 Trillion in Revenue: Re-
search Finds that $36K of VC Investment Creates a US Job, at
http://www.nvca.org/nvcal0-22-01.html (Oct. 22, 2001) (releasing a study con-
ducted by DRI-WEFA stating that venture-backed U.S. companies represented
1,415,748 jobs in California in 2000).
7. DOERFLINGER & RIVKIN, supra note 1, at 180 (citing the development of
most computer technologies as the product of corporate investors acting as ven-
ture capitalists).
8. See National Venture Capital Association, supra note 6.
9. See infra Part III.
10. Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act, CAL. CORP. CODE §§
17000-17656 (West Supp. 2005).
11. See 5 BALLANTINE & STERLING CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS §
900.02[5] (R. Bradbury Clark ed., Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2004) ("The [Bev-
erly-Killea Limited Liability Company] Act is designed especially to assist the
formation and operation of small, closely held... business arrangements.").
12. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 2005).
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. For general reasons to abolish the doctrine, see generally Stephen M.
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It draws upon arguments that have been made in the corpo-
rate law context, 5 but distinguishes aspects unique to LLCs.
To that end, Part II briefly discusses the LLC entity, the doc-
trine of veil-piercing, the role that venture capitalists play,
and the position California has taken towards small busi-
nesses, particularly those in the high-tech sector. 6 Part III of
this comment identifies the problem with the current liability
scheme. Part IV dissects the perverse incentives created by
the veil-piercing liability system and discusses the attributes
of an ideal system. 8 Finally, Part V concludes with a pro-
posal to reform the LLC entity into one that is consistent with
California's best interests, encourages venture capitalists to
behave rationally, and allows the LLC to mature into a form
distinct from the corporate entity.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. LLCs
Prospective entrepreneurs face many important decisions
before they begin their business dealings," such as which
type of entity the business should use to conduct its com-
merce." California law allows entrepreneurs to choose from
many entity forms, including the sole proprietorship," the
corporation," the general partnership, 4 the limited partner-
ship,"5 the limited liability partnership ("LLP"), 6 and the
Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001).
15. See infra Part II.B. Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge advocated elimi-
nation of the veil-piercing doctrine from corporate jurisprudence in an article
entitled Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001). Some of his argu-
ments are relied upon here.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 20 (R.
Bradbury Clark ed., Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2004).
21. Id.
22. California Secretary of State, California Business Portal, Starting a
Business, at http://www.ss.ca.gov/business/filings.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2005).
23. Id. See also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1-19 (West 1990).
24. California Secretary of State, supra note 22. See also CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 16100-16114 (West Supp. 2005).
25. California Secretary of State, supra note 22. See also CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 15501-15533 (West 1990).
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newest permissible form, the limited liability company.27 En-
trepreneurs determine which entity type is the most appro-
priate for their forthcoming businesses by considering several
factors, including cost of formation, transferability of interest,
lifespan of the entity, profit and loss distribution among own-
ers, management system, taxation, and liability. 8
A popular entity form that has long been recognized un-
der California law is the corporation. 9 In contrast to partner-
ships, where the entity is simply the sum of all the partners, °
a corporation has an existence separate and distinct from its
owners." The artificial personality of the corporation is, of
course, a legal fiction, and therefore practitioners often de-
scribe the two identities as being separated by a "veil."32 The
existence of two separate entities implies that shareholders
should not be held liable for the corporation's debts and obli-
gations."
Non-liability has been rationalized on several grounds,
but one of the most frequently cited reasons is that the use of
a rule allowing personal liability would ultimately harm soci-
ety by inhibiting economic growth.' If investors can be held
personally liable for the actions of the companies in which
they invest, they will be discouraged from diversifying their
investments.35 The cost of prudent investing (i.e., the cost of
monitoring the company invested in) increases with the num-
ber of companies invested in, not with the amount invested
26. California Secretary of State, supra note 22. See also CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 16951-16962 (West Supp. 2005).
27. California Secretary of State, supra note 22. See also Beverly-Killea
Limited Liability Company Act, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17656 (West Supp.
2005).
28. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 38-40, 78 (5th ed. 2001).
29. The first Constitution of the State of California, adopted in 1849, in-
cluded several sections relating to corporations. 1 BALLANTINE, supra note 20, §
4.01.
30. SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 28, at 78 ("[The partnership] is primarily
treated as an aggregate of its principals.").
31. 2 BALLANTINE & STERLING CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 295 (R.
Bradbury Clark ed., Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2004).
32. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8-9 (N.Y. 1966).
33. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS OF THE SECTION OF CORP., BANKING &
Bus. LAw OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N, REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
§ 6.22 (1985).
34. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 491.
35. Id.
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per company.36 Therefore, investors will be best served by
making one large investment into a single company.37 Diver-
sification is central to many investors' risk-reduction strate-
gies.38 Consequently, any hindrance of the ability to diversify
increases the risk of investing.39 This higher risk is a cost ul-
timately borne by society since businesses will grow less rap-
idly because the price of securing investment capital will be
higher." To avoid this dilemma altogether, corporate statutes
limit the personal liability of investing shareholders to their
initial investment.4'
The LLC is a relatively new hybrid entity that combines
the tax transparency of a partnership with the limited liabil-
ity aspect of a corporation.4 ' The LLC form was designed to
foster the formation of small businesses and addresses many
of the impediments that other entity forms did not.44 Some
entities subjected business owners to unlimited personal li-
ability, some required the business owners to pay a double
tax, and others hindered the owners' discretion in managing
their own businesses.4' By selecting the LLC entity, small
business owners could avoid each of these drawbacks.46
While shareholders of a corporation may not manage the
47
company while acting in the capacity of a shareholder, in
contrast, LLC members are permitted to handle even the day-
to-day operations of the business while still enjoying the pro-
tection of the veil.48 Small businesses generally require flexi-
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 491.
41. Id. at 293.
42. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[2].
43. Id. § 900.02[5].
44. Corporation shareholders were required to pay a double tax, partnership
partners were subjected to unlimited personal liability, and corporation share-
holders could not exercise control over the corporation's daily business.
SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 28, at 37, 79.
45. Id.
46. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[2].
47. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1990) (stating that "the business and af-
fairs of the corporation shall be managed... by or under the direction of the
board," not the shareholders).
48. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 2005). But see § 17157(b)(1)
(stating that in a manager-managed LLC, members do not have the power to
bind the business if they are not managers).
10132005
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ble management structures,49 and, consequently, the Califor-
nia LLC statute permits operation through a member-
managed or a manager-managed structure." In the former,
any member's acts can bind the LLC.51 In the latter, only the
managers have the authority to bind the LLC.52 Conse-
quently, they owe fiduciary duties to the LLC and its mem-
bers.5"
Although the LLC business structure may provide entic-
ing incentives, LLC statutes generally do not allow all entre-
preneurs to organize under the LLC form.5 4 The California
statute, for example, prohibits the use of LLCs to render pro-
fessional services5 and services in the fields of banking, trust
56
company, or insurance.
LLCs and corporations share many similarities and have
frequently been the subject of comparison.57 Like corpora-
tions, LLCs enjoy limited liability in that the owners cannot
be held personally liable for business debts and obligations.58
The owners, generally, are liable only to the extent of the
capital that owner has contributed to the business.59 Both en-
tities are required to file articles with the Secretary of State
in order to be created," and both can have perpetual duration
as a lifespan.61
49. See BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[5].
50. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17151 (West Supp. 2005).
51. Id. § 17157(a). However, a member's acts do not bind the LLC if the
member had no authority to do so and the party dealing with that member had
actual knowledge of the absence of power. Id.
52. Id. § 17157(b).
53. Id. §17153.
54. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[6].
55. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17375 (West Supp. 2005).
56. Id. § 17002.
57. See generally Karin Schwindt, Limited Liability Companies: Issues in
Member Liability, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1541 (1997) (comparing the doctrine of veil-
piercing in the LLC context with the doctrine in the corporate context); J. Wil-
liam Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving the Limited
Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97
(2000) (discussing corporate attributes which should be imported into the LLC
body of law).
58. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17151, 17158(a) (West Supp. 2005).
59. But see id. § 17201(a)(2) (holding owners liable for unfulfilled capital
commitments).
60. Corporations are required to file under California Corporation Code sec-
tion 200, and LLCs are required to do the same under California Corporation
Code section 17050. CAL. CORP. CODE § 200 (West 1990); CAL. CORP. CODE §
17050 (West Supp. 2005).
61. CAL. CORP. CODE § 200(c) (West 1990); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17051(c)(3)
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Some LLC characteristics, however, are similar to those
of corporations only if the particular organizer so chooses.
Taxation is one example. Formerly, LLCs were required to
maintain partnership attributes in order to qualify for single-
level taxation.62 Currently, California LLCs can simply elect
to have corporate taxation or partnership taxation under the
"check-the-box" system.63 Another example is governance
structure. As stated above, LLCs can be operated through a
member-managed or a manager-managed system, the latter
slightly resembling the centralized management system of
corporations,' even though it does not call for the creation of
a board of directors.65 A third example concerns capitaliza-
tion. Unlike stock issuance in corporations, LLC membership
interests can be acquired by simply promising to make future
contributions."6
One significant difference between LLCs and corpora-
tions is the absence of an extensive body of case law.67 Corpo-
rations have existed in California since the adoption of the
California Constitution and have been involved in numerous
cases.' Whereas the bounds of the law governing corpora-
tions have been fairly well delineated, the bounds of LLC law
are yet to be fully tested.69 In some areas, California has
statutorily solved this problem by adopting aspects of corpo-
rate law into LLC law.
(West Supp. 2005).
62. 2 ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELE H. HUDSON, VENTURE CAPITAL AND
SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING § 3:27 (9th prtg. 2004) (1984) (stating that LLCs
were required to lack two of four corporate characteristics to qualify for part-
nership taxation).
63. Currently, the California State Board of Equalization and the Internal
Revenue Service both allow LLCs to choose partnership taxation with a simple
check in the appropriate box on the tax form. Compare CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §
28.5 (West 1998) (classifying LLCs as partnerships for tax purposes), and Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2003).
64. See Callison, supra note 57, at 111-12 (noting the similarities and differ-
ences in operational management functions and control functions between LLC
managers and corporation directors).
65. See id. (noting that only three states include a board of directors in the
LLC statutes).
66. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17200(a) (West Supp. 2005) (permitting members to
provide binding future commitments as capital contribution).
67. See BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.0215].
68. A search of California corporate case law on LexisNexis retrieves more
than 3,000 hits.
69. HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 62, § 3:35 (stating that there is nothing
well-established or predictable about LLCs).
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One instance of this approach can be found in the per-
sonal liability statute. Section 17101 of the California Corpo-
rations Code states:
[N]o member of a limited liability company shall be per-
sonally liable ... for any debt, obligation, or liability of the
limited liability company .... A member.., shall be sub-
ject to liability under the common law governing alter ego
liability, and shall also be personally liable.., under the
same or similar circumstances and to the same extent as a
shareholder of a corporation may be personally liable for
70any debt, obligation, or liability of the corporation ....
Alter ego liability7 is one of the bases for disregarding
the corporate fiction (i.e., piercing the corporate veil) that oc-
curs "where a corporation is organized and operated as a
mere tool or business conduit of another corporation."72
B. Piercing the Veil
"'Piercing the corporate veil' refers to the judicially im-
posed exception to [the non-liability] principle by which courts
disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a
shareholder responsible for the corporation's action as if it
were the shareholder's own."73 All fifty states now recognize
LLCs,74 but not all states have been equally instructive on
how to handle the veil-piercing doctrine. While California
chose to statutorily adopt alter ego liability and other per-
sonal liability "to the same extent as a shareholder of a corpo-
70. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(a), (b) (West Supp. 2005).
71. For a description of the alter ego doctrine, see BALLANTINE, supra note
31, § 295.
72. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986) (quoting Pa-
cific Am. Gasoline Co. of Tex. v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 833, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934)).
73. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991). As an example, consider individual X,
who incorporates his mobile home sales business and capitalizes the corporation
with a promissory note, which he never pays. X neglects to maintain corporate
minutes. Y, a purchaser of a defective mobile home from this business, success-
fully sues the corporation. If the corporation is unable to satisfy the judgment
because it was never properly capitalized, arguably Y should be able to pierce
the veil of the corporation and hold X personally liable. If X is allowed to argue
that the corporation is a separate entity, an inequitable result will follow be-
cause X never treated the corporation as a separate entity, but nevertheless is
allowed to obtain the protections of separate entity status. For a more detailed
illustration, see Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
74. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[1].
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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
ration" when it enacted the Beverly-Killea LLC Act in 1996,"5
the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act chose to remain
silent on the issue."6 The doctrine began as a common-law ex-
ception to the general rule of limited liability for shareholders
in a corporation, but has become the most litigated, yet one of
the most confusing, issues in corporate law.77 It has been
noted that judicial opinions are long on rhetoric and short on
reasoning, using catchwords such as "alter ego," "screen," and
"instrumentality," followed by barely any substantive expla-
nation.8
Veil-piercing can occur in a number of different business
structures. The simplest scenario involves holding individual
shareholders personally liable for the acts of their corpora-
tion.71 Veil-piercing also occurs, however, in enterprise situa-
tions. o In a business enterprise, multiple artificial entities
are created. Often, a "parent" corporation owns some or all of
the shares of a "subsidiary" corporation.8' If the parent corpo-
ration owns stock in multiple subsidiary corporations, those
subsidiary corporations are "sibling" corporations of each
other.82 Where justified, two veils will be pierced and the
shareholders of a parent corporation will be held liable for the
obligations of the subsidiary corporation." Even more ex-
traordinary, however, is that some corporations have been
held liable for the obligations of their sibling corporations
(i.e., corporations that share the same parent corporation).'
The reach of personal liability often depends on the equities
of the situation, a nebulous concept which itself can turn on
many factors.5
75. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 2005).
76. DEL. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 18-303 (2005).
77. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1036.
78. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1556.
79. Individuals, as opposed to artificial business entities, stand as the de-
fendant in approximately fifty-five percent of veil-piercing cases. See Thomp-
son, supra note 73, at 1055.
80. Parent corporations have been held liable for their subsidiaries' acts in
thirty-seven percent of the instances the court has faced the issue. Id. at 1055.
81. See Thompson, supra note 73, at 1057.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1057, n.111.
84. See, e.g., Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
85. A determination of what is equitable is within the court's discretion and
is often adjudged on a case-by-case basis. DOUG RENDLEMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 156-57 (6th ed. 1999).
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In Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc. ,86 the Supreme Court of West
Virginia laid forth a two-prong alter-ego test that determines
whether a corporate veil should be pierced in breach of con-
tract cases.87 First, a determination must be made of whether
the corporate formalities were disregarded and whether the
personalities of the corporation and the individual have been
separated.88 Second, the court must determine whether fair-
ness requires piercing the veil because an inequitable result
would otherwise occur.89 To help determine whether the first
prong has been satisfied, the court enumerated factors that
are instructive.9 ° Among them are the use of the corporation
to perform fraudulent acts, the placement of management
and ownership in the same persons, the failure to hold meet-
ings, and the failure to adequately capitalize the corpora-
tion.9'
All of these factors, however, are not directly transferable
to LLC law.9" For example, California Corporations Code Sec-
tion 17101 specifically excludes the failure to hold meetings
and observe formalities from the piercing analysis. 3 This is
because those actions are not required under the LLC stat-
utes,9 4 unless elected for in the articles of organization or op-
erating agreement.95 If they are so elected, the failure to ob-
serve those formalities may condition the piercing of the
veil.96 Also rendered unnecessary under the LLC statutes is
the requirement of adequate capitalization.97 Initial funding
of an LLC business is permissive, not mandatory 8
The Laya two-prong test has generally been followed in
86. 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
87. Id. at 99.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 98-99.
91. Id.
92. LLCs have attributes that differ from those of corporations. See supra
Part II.A. Therefore, some parts of the corporate veil-piercing doctrine cannot
be cleanly imported into LLC jurisprudence.
93. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 2005).
94. Id. § 17104 (making member meetings permissive, not mandatory).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 17101(b) (reinstating the observance of formalities as a veil-
piercing factor where the articles of organization expressly require formalities
to be observed); BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 904.14[2] [b].
97. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17200(a) (West Supp. 2005); 1 HAROLD MARSH ET
AL., MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 3.05[D] [1] [a] (4th ed. 2005).
98. 1 MARSH ET AL., supra note 97, § 3.05[D] [1] [a].
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California,99 but Laya also suggested a third possible prong.1°°
The third prong is based on the theory that the piercing
analysis should differ for tort cases and contract cases since
only the latter involves a plaintiff who voluntarily forms a re-
lationship with the defendant corporation.' Consistent with
this theory, the Laya court held that if, under the circum-
stances, it was reasonable for a contract creditor 10 2 to conduct
a reasonable investigation of the corporation prior to entering
into a contract with it, then the contract creditor is charged
with the knowledge that the investigation would have dis-
closed.' If the investigation would have disclosed the corpo-
ration's undercapitalization, then the contract creditor is
deemed to have assumed the risk that any recovery he may
later obtain against the corporation would be limited.' In
such a case, the contract creditor would not be allowed to
pierce the veil. Accordingly, many analysts expected the veil
to be pierced more frequently at the insistence of a tort claim-
ant. 
05
In 1991, Robert B. Thompson tested this expectation by
performing an empirical study of the factors that affect the
court's decision to pierce the corporate veil."' Thompson's re-
sults were surprising because they suggest that courts are
more willing to pierce the veil when a corporation breaches a
contract than when it commits a tort.0 7 In addition to this
discovery, Thompson found three other significant revela-
tions, namely that courts pierce the veil in seventy-three per-
cent of the cases where undercapitalization is found,10' the
doctrine applies exclusively to closely-held companies, 59 and
99. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 508 (stating the two Laya factors comprise
the test used in California). See, e.g., Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock,
Rothert & Bunshoft, LLP, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 442-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999);
Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d
419, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
100. Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.
101. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1565.
102. The term contract creditor encompasses all classes of voluntary credi-
tors. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 487 n.40.
103. Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.
104. Id.
105. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1563-64.
106. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1058-59.
107. Id. at 1058.
108. Id. at 1064, 1065.
109. Id. at 1039.
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California has been more inclined to pierce the corporate veil
than most states."' Thompson's statistics have been relied on
in several other articles."'
One article that relied on those figures was written by
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge and advocates the abolition
of the corporate veil-piercing doctrine."2  Bainbridge begins
his article by asserting the problem: judges have too much
discretion in handling veil-piercing cases and, therefore,
vague standards are created.' Consequently, practitioners
are unable to effectively advise their clients when personal li-
ability may be imposed."'
Having given a reason to think critically about the veil-
piercing doctrine, Bainbridge proceeds to explain its under-
pinnings. First, he discusses why limited liability is the gen-
eral rule."5 In contract cases, limited liability is merely a de-
fault rule which places the onus of bargaining for a personal
guarantee on the party that is best situated to determine
when a guarantee is necessary."6 In most cases, this is the
party seeking to deal with the corporation."7 Although this
"best situated" rationale cannot be applied to tort cases, lim-
ited liability is still tolerated in tort cases because otherwise,
as explained above, investors would curtail their investments
and the U.S. economy would suffer."8 Bainbridge then articu-
lates the exceptions to the general rule of limited liability
(i.e., instances where the veil should be pierced)." 9
To complete his analysis, Bainbridge demonstrates how
the policies underlying the general rule and its exceptions can
be advanced equally well through an alternative liability re-
110. Id. at 1050-52.
111. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 505, 513, 517, 524, 528, 531, 534;
Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1555-58.
112. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 14.
113. Id. at 481.
114. Id. This hindrance is generally disfavored because it increases transac-
tional costs and creates societal waste. Id.
115. See generally id. at 487-506.
116. Id. at 502-03. This is the default rule because placing the burden on the
party with a lesser knowledge of when a personal guarantee is necessary would
be wasteful of society's resources. Id. In such a case, that party would have to
spend money to discover what the other party already knows. Id. The costs
that are incurred are ultimately passed on to society. Id.
117. Id. at 503.
118. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 494.
119. See generally id. at 506-14.
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gime that is clearer and less vague than the veil-piercing sys-
tem.12' This alternative regime utilizes theories of direct li-
ability and enterprise liability. 2' Under direct liability, only
he who directly causes a loss is held personally liable. 2 Un-
der enterprise liability, a defendant corporation, its parent
corporation, its sibling corporations, etc., are all jointly held
liable if their separate entity status is not observed and the
corporate form is thereby abused. 22
Bainbridge pointed out two efficiencies gained by replac-
ing the veil-piercing doctrine with a system of direct and en-
terprise liability. First, because direct liability is much less
vague, practitioners are better equipped to advise their cli-
ents."'24 Second, under a system of enterprise liability, the law
better serves its commitment to limiting an investor's loss to
the amount contributed.
2 5
C. Venture Capitalism
Venture capitalists are entities willing to invest in new or
small businesses, where the risk of losing the invested capital
is high.'26 Venture capitalists bear the risk of loss in return
for the possibility of reaping substantial rewards.127 Their two
main goals are either to take the invested company public or
120. See generally id. at 514-34.
121. See generally id.
122. Id. at 516.
123. Id. at 526-27. Abuse of the corporate form occurs where an entrepre-
neur manipulates the limited liability shield. Abuse is normally found where
two entities have such similar interests that their separate existence has ceased
to exist, and where treating those entities as separate would promote injustice.
See id. at 527-28.
124. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 534-35.
125. Where the law is governed by the theories of direct and enterprise liabil-
ity, a non-culpable individual investor cannot lose more than the amount he in-
vested. Id. at 529. Under this system, however, if the investor is an artificial
entity, the investor can be liable for more than the amount it originally contrib-
uted to the subsidiary. Id. at 526. Bainbridge explains that the ability to dis-
criminate on the basis of the identity of the investor is possible because the doc-
trine of veil-piercing involves vertical liability, while enterprise liability involves
horizontal liability. Id. After veil-piercing is abolished, individual owners can-
not be held liable because they are vertically related to the corporation. Id.
Through enterprise liability, however, parent corporations can still be held li-
able because, if an enterprise exists, the parent is, in reality, horizontally re-
lated to the subsidiary. Id.
126. GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., THE ECONOMIST: DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS
381 (2003).
127. QUINDLEN, supra note 2, at 18.
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to sell the invested company to another for a higher price. '
Venture capital is necessary to enable entrepreneurs without
sufficient capital of their own to start new businesses.' 9
Most venture capital firms have a uniform structure. 3 '
Firms are frequently organized as limited partnerships,'3'
where the limited partners consist of investors that provide
capital, but seek to avoid personal liability.3 2 The limited
partnership. also consists of general partners who organize
the funds in which the limited partners invest.'33 The funds
are normally provided by another business entity or an insti-
tutional investor," and only rarely by an individual inves-
tor. 15
Although venture capitalist firms can be found in many
heavily populated states, most major firms operate at least a
branch office in California. 36 Specifically, most venture capi-
talists in California are located within a twenty-mile radius
stretching out from Palo Alto.'37 These offices are strategi-
cally placed near the high-tech businesses that have blos-
somed since the 1970s.
38
Because venture capitalists risk such a high probability
of loss of their investment, they often insist that they be given
a position on the board of directors in addition to their equity
stake in the company. ' Since a position on the board of di-
128. Id.
129. JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 495 (1997).
130. National Venture Capital Association, supra note 3 (noting that limited
partnerships are the predominant form of venture capital firms).
131. Id. Limited partnerships consist of general partners who manage the
partnership, but are subject to personal liability, and limited partners who do
not manage the firm, but have their personal assets protected. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 15501 (West 1991).
132. § 15507; 4 BALLANTINE & STERLING CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS §
723.02 (R. Bradbury Clark ed., Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2004) (referring to lim-
ited partners who are pure investors, and thus should not be sued).
133. National Venture Capital Assocation, supra note 3 (describing the
makeup of the typical venture capital firm).
134. QUINDLEN, supra note 2, at 18.
135. Id. at 18. Firms are reluctant to include personal investors as limited
partners because they tend to be short-term investors that do not represent a
consistent source of money through a volatile economy. Id.
136. See id. at 4.
137. Id.
138. QUINDLEN, supra note 2, at 3. One venture capitalist dubbed Sand Hill
Road in Menlo Park "the financial ground zero of Silicon Valley" because almost
all venture capital offices are located there. Id. at 4.
139. Id. at 18.
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rectors can only be given if it exists, not all business forms
are conducive to venture capital investment."' It is not al-
ways only the venture capitalist, however, that wants the
venture capitalist firm to have a share of the management.4 '
Start-up entrepreneurs are industrial revolutionaries who
understand technology, not business. Consequently, they
commonly need help commercializing their product.. and of-
ten turn to venture capitalists for the business experience
that will help their company succeed.4 The firm is able to
provide that experience because of the familiarity with the
start-up process it gains from other ventures.'"
Analysts forecasted that LLCs will have special appeal to
venture capital funded high-tech companies,' 4' but several
reasons exist why venture capitalists should not invest in
LLCs.'4 Some cynically view the two as incompatible due to
the fact that venture capitalists hold sacred the ability to exit
an investment, yet LLC membership interests are inherently
less liquid than corporate shares. 47  Others believe that the
agency responsibilities and fiduciary duties that accompany
140. See Callison, supra note 57, at 116 (noting that, of the fifty states, only
the Minnesota, North Dakota, and Tennessee LLC acts provide for a board of
governors).
141. DOERFLINGER & RIVKIN, supra note 1, at 221 (describing the biotech in-
dustry as one short on money and industrial know-how). See also QUINDLEN,
supra note 2, at 40-41 (describing the founders of Excite as immature kids who
know little about how to build a business).
142. DOERFLINGER & RIVKIN, supra note 1, at 13.
143. Id. at 24-25.
144. Id.
145. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[5].
146. Callison, supra note 57, at 98 ('Conventional wisdom holds that venture
capital firms generally do not invest in limited liability companies .... ").
147. Id. at 109-10. An "exit strategy" is a venture capitalist's plan to cash out
of a particular investment. See DAVID GLADSTONE, VENTURE CAPITAL
INVESTING: THE COMPLETE HANDBOOK FOR INVESTING IN SMALL PRIVATE
BUSINESSES FOR OUTSTANDING PROFITS 217-33 (1988), for a review of six differ-
ent exit strategies. Membership interests are illiquid for two reasons. The first
reason is based on the fact that the owners of the LLCs are the same people who
control it. Callison, supra note 57, at 107. Since all members of a LLC are
granted the power to bind the company, current members of any LLC have an
incentive to restrict membership interests from flowing into the hands of inves-
tors that lack business acumen. Id. at 109. Because the membership interests
are restricted, they are illiquid. A second reason which may be given is that
venture capitalists often exit their investments through initial public offerings,
GLADSTONE, supra at 218, and it is uncommon to find a publicly traded LLC.
This latter reason, however, does not present a substantial obstacle because
LLCs can be reorganized into corporations.
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the manager position (and the member position in a member-
managed LLC) make LLC interests unattractive.4 ' Those du-
ties require venture capitalists to reluctantly forego other in-
vestment opportunities that may compete with the LLC. 9
Finally, some believe that LLC investments are too difficult
to protect and, therefore, venture capitalists should not make
such investments.' ° In member-managed LLCs, investments
are difficult to protect because, to the detriment of venture
capitalists investors, all owners can exercise control, even
those unqualified to do so."' In manager-managed LLCs, the
difficulty stems from the fact that venture capitalist members
can ensure that the managers are working in their best inter-
ests only by incurring expensive monitoring costs."1
2
Despite the obstacles that make LLCs poor investment
vehicles, the very people who question the suitability of LLCs
for venture funding also advocate the tailoring of LLC law to
fit it."' These people recognize the link between venture capi-
tal and LLCs, namely, that both aim to foster small business
growth."' The intention of the California legislature in creat-
ing the LLC entity was to encourage small business forma-
tion."' Venture financiers then pick up where the legislators
leave off by seeking to expand these small, newly formed
businesses."
148. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17150, 17153 (West Supp. 2005). Agency power is
the power to bind. Consequently, those entrusted with that power have the
highest duty imposed on them.
149. Callison, supra note 57, at 110-11. While this requirement is unobjec-
tionable for investors who diversify their investments among many industries,
it is a significant encumbrance to venture capitalists who prefer to create spe-
cialized funds, i.e., portfolios consisting of several companies from the same sec-
tor.
150. Id. at 98.
151. Id. at 109. In member-managed LLCs, all owners are vested with the
power to bind the LLC, § 17157(a), even though the power is ideally concen-
trated in the hands of specialized decision-makers. This problem is particularly
vexatious in high-tech companies where the making of prudent judgments often
requires a technical background. Callison, supra note 57, at 109.
152. Callison, supra note 57, at 112.
153. See, e.g., id. at 98.
154. See, e.g., id.
155. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[5] (stating "[t]he Act is designed
especially to assist the formation and operation of small, closely held or closely
controlled business arrangements.").
156. See KUNZE, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that the only companies which
are eligible to receive venture capital are those that can tripe in value and grow
to have potential sales of at least twenty-five million dollars within six years).
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Although venture capital constitutes only a small portion
of overall corporate finance in the United States,5" it has
made a significant impact on the nation's economy.' The
National Venture Capital Association ("NVCA") released a
study that indicated that thirty years of venture capital in-
vestment created 7.6 million United States jobs and has ac-
counted for $1.3 trillion of revenue.'59 The jobs and revenues
were created not only in the computer, consumer, and health-
care industries, but also in the communications, biotech, elec-
tronics, and energy sectors. 6 ° The number of venture capital
deals has increased steadily throughout the United States be-
tween 1990 and 2000.161 In 1990, 1,433 deals were made with
an average investment of $1.93 million per deal."' In 2000,
the number of deals reached 7,832, with an average invest-
ment of more than $13 million per deal .' During the recent
recession, those numbers have declined dramatically.'6
D. California's Position and History
California has benefited greatly from the investment of
venture funds,'165 receiving significantly more venture capital
than any other state during the three decades leading up to
2000.166 During that time, approximately $109 trillion was
invested in California by venture capital funds.'67 Moreover,
in the year 2000 alone, venture-backed U.S. companies gen-
erated more revenue and jobs in California than in any other
state. "'68 California venture-backed businesses generated ap-
proximately $270 trillion in revenue"6 9 and 1.5 million jobs.
157. Callison, supra note 57, at 98.
158. National Venture Capital Association, DRI-WEFA Study Identifies Ven-
ture Capital as a Key Factor Powering U.S. Economic Growth, at
httpJ/www.nvca.org/nvca06 25_02.html (Jun. 26, 2002) (pointing to the impact
venture capital has had on research and development, creation of new indus-
tries, tax revenues, and job growth).
159. National Venture Capital Association, supra note 6.
160. Id.
161. National Venture Capital Association, Industry Statistics, at
http://www.nvca.org/ffax.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See National Venture Capital Association, supra note 6.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
10252005
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Much of these figures involved the high-tech sector in the
Silicon Valley,' but California has also enjoyed significant
investment of venture capital in the biotech industry in the
San Diego area.12  Venture capitalists, however, recognize
that these two investments differ.' 3 Unlike the companies in
the computer and semiconductor industries, small biotech
companies cannot turn a quick profit and then expand by re-
investing that profit. 7 4 The exact opposite occurs in biotech,
where the companies often show no meaningful profit until
many years after the investment is made.'75 Although it is
unlikely that many small biotech companies will be able to
take their place among the Fortune 500 in the near future,
the biotech industry has received its share of venture capital
funding.7 6
1. The Business without Funding: A Hypothetical
Able, an avid bioengineer, has finally developed an effec-
tive cure for the common cold. Hoping to share his invention
with society and make a fair profit while doing so, Able de-
cides to form a business to commercialize his new invention.
Able forms an LLC because he cannot afford paying a double
tax and he is unwilling to face unlimited liability. This busi-
170. Id.
171. Christian Berthelsen, Big Investment Banks Flee Sand Hill Road: Deals
Dry up along Wall Street West, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 2003, at Al, A8 (discuss-
ing the growing appetite of venture capitalists for the Silicon Valley during the
1970-2000 era).
172. Marc Ballon, Heard on the Beat: Small Business: Less Venture Capital
for Local Biotechs, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2000 (O.C. Business Plus), at C3 (com-
menting on the popularity of San Diego County biotech and medical device
firms among venture capitals).
173. DOERFLINGER & RIVKIN, supra note 1, at 215.
174. Id. See also QUINDLEN, supra note 2, at 8-14 (discussing the Internet
explosion).
175. DOERFLINGER & RIVKIN, supra note 1, at 219 (discussing recombinant
DNA technology). One example of such a non-commercial achievement is the
elucidation of the human genome. Despite the monumental importance of this
feat, it remains commercially insignificant until, at a minimum, the gene se-
quences are identified. Although the completion of the human genome project
has scientific value, the products biotech companies hope to commercialize re-
quire post-sequencing research. See, e.g., Celera Genomics, Target Discovery &
Validation, at http://www.celera.com/celera/discovery-platforms (last visited
Apr. 24, 2005). The human genome is available for download, free of cost, at
http://www.ncbi.nih.gov/genome/guide/human (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
176. DOERFLINGER & RVKIN, supra note 1, at 220. See Ballon, supra note
172, at C3.
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ness entity permits him to take an active role in the man-
agement of his own company, without making an initial capi-
tal contribution.
Able, however, still needs financing to mass produce his
new invention. Able is reluctant to even attempt to raise
money through the solicitation of numerous individual inves-
tors because he is inexperienced in complying with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission's regulations. Able, there-
fore, pursues funding from VenCap, a limited partnership
engaged in the venture capital business. VenCap is uncom-
fortable with the fact that this is Able's first business, but is
confident that the business can succeed under the manage-
ment of VenCap's experienced general partners. Neverthe-
less, VenCap struggles with the decision of whether to invest
in Able's LLC because VenCap's fund can only afford to fi-
nance one more business and VenCap is also considering in-
vesting in Competitor, Inc., a larger business that offers the
prospect of higher returns, but requires a larger invest-
ment.
177
One reason why VenCap has limited funds is exemplified
by investor X. X is a sophisticated institutional investor that
VenCap hopes will join as a limited partner. X recognizes,
however, that because veil-piercing is a lingering possibility,
X is better off making multiple, discrete investments than it
is making one lump investment into a venture capital firm. 8
By making multiple, discrete investments, X separates each
investment and prevents them from affecting one another. In
contrast, if X makes a single investment into a venture capi-
tal firm, X's entire investment can be lost if one company
within the venture capitalist's portfolio has its veil pierced.
X, therefore, chooses not to join VenCap.
Meanwhile, to solve the question of which business to fi-
nance, VenCap considers the costs that are associated with
investing in each business. VenCap makes its decision based
on the law as it stands today-where both LLCs and corpora-
tions are capable of having their veils pierced. Because veil-
piercing is possible, VenCap determines it will make expendi-
tures to monitor each company it invests in. These expendi-
177. It is assumed here that the LLC is the smaller business because the
Beverly-Killea LLC Act was aimed at helping the growth of small businesses.
BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[5].
178. See supra Part II.A.
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tures, VenCap figures, are important because VenCap deals
with relatively small companies, and these closely-held com-
panies are the types that are the most amenable to veil-
piercing.179 VenCap concludes that it can minimize these
monitoring costs by minimizing the number of companies in-
vested in. To do this, VenCap decides to invest in seven lar-
ger businesses, rather than to diversify over ten smaller ones.
VenCap chooses to finance the larger Competitor, Inc. Able's
LLC is left unfunded and society is deprived of Able's cure for
the common cold.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
"Piercing the corporate veil" began as a narrow exception
to the general rule of non-liability, but the doctrine has bur-
geoned into the most frequently litigated issue in corporate
law. 8 ° By adopting the corporate standard into LLCs,18 1 the
same frequency of litigation can be expected.'82 In order to
curb meritless attacks'83 on investors and decrease the costs
associated with those attacks,'84 the current LLC liability
scheme should be reconsidered.
Several reasons exist to abolish the veil-piercing doctrine
from LLC jurisprudence. When the doctrine is utilized, it
creates a body of law burdened by vague standards that pre-
vent practitioners from effectively advising their clients. 8 5 It
also restrains the LLC entity from maturing into its proper
form and differentiating itself from the corporate entity.
Moreover, it imposes liability that renders the promise of lim-
179. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1039. Veil piercing does not occur in pub-
licly traded companies. Id. Moreover, venture capitalists should be particularly
careful about veil piercing since they frequently take part in the business's
management-one factor in courts' decisions to pierce the veil. Id. at 1063-64.
180. Id. at 1036.
181. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 2005).
182. None of the differences between the LLC entity and the corporate entity
appear significant enough to discourage plaintiffs from invoking the doctrine
against LLC members.
183. Although frequently litigated, veil-piercing is successfully argued in only
forty percent of the cases. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1048.
184. In addition to the transactional cost (i.e., the inability of lawyers to ad-
vise their clients on how to properly arrange their transactions so as to avoid
veil-piercing suits), another cost is associated with veil-piercing: the monetary
costs of bringing and defending suits.
185. Practitioners will not know how to advise their clients because suits will
be decided on a case-by-case basis. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 481.
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ited liability empty. '86 The problem highlighted here, how-
ever, is the impact it has on the growth of small businesses.
Although California intended to encourage the growth of
small business within the state by enacting the Beverly-
Killea Limited Liability Company Act,'87 that Act's veil-
piercing scheme hampers California's efforts by creating per-
verse incentives that potentially deprive those businesses of
funding.'8 First, it gives venture capital firms reason to not
invest in small LLC businesses. Second, even if venture capi-
talists are willing to invest in LLCs, the veil-piercing doctrine
gives investors reason to not invest in venture capital funds.
Without adequate funds, venture capitalists cannot finance
the LLCs.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Problems with the Current System
The current position of the California legislature on veil-
piercing in LLCs is not completely without merit, as the goals
behind it are laudable. The second prong of the piercing
analysis announced in Laya, the inequitable result, inher-
ently suggests the praiseworthiness of the doctrine.9 How-
ever, that doctrine creates two incentives that justify its abo-
lition.
1. Venture Capitalists'Incentive to Not Invest in LLCs
LLCs are suitable for venture capital investment.' 90 Until
the check-the-box taxation system was introduced, LLCs may
have been unattractive to venture capitalists because they
could not take advantage of corporate characteristics such as
continuity of life, centralized management, and free transfer-
ability of interests, and still qualify for partnership taxa-
186. David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability
Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the
Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liabil-
ity Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 457 (1998).
187. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[5].
188. See discussion infra Part V.A.
189. Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 99 (W. Va. 1986) (including the
occurrence of an inequitable result as a prong in the analysis).
190. Venture capitalists fund many high-tech businesses, and the LLC form
is appealing to many high-tech businesses. Callison, supra note 57, at 98 (list-
ing reasons why the LLC form would be appealing to high-tech start-ups).
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tion."' Those characteristics are important to venture capi-
talists'92 and are allowable under the current tax regime.'93
Under the current system, however, venture capitalists
have an incentive to forgo investing in smaller LLCs and in-
stead invest in larger corporations. Currently, both LLCs and
corporations utilize the doctrine of veil-piercing. 4  Conse-
quently, a venture capitalist investing in either will have to
pay monitoring costs to ensure that the business behaves le-
gally.'95 The total amount spent monitoring depends on the
number of companies invested in, not the amount invested
per company. Therefore, venture capitalists will have an in-
centive to invest in fewer, but larger businesses, 96 rather
than in multiple smaller businesses, which frequently are
LLCs.'97 As a result, LLCs will find it more difficult to secure
venture capital than will their larger corporate counterparts.
2. Investors' Incentive to Not Partner in Venture Capital
Firms
Investors seeking to make large investments in busi-
nesses can do so directly by purchasing stock in several com-
panies, or indirectly by joining as a limited partner in a ven-
ture capital firm that will, in turn, invest in several
companies. The decision to make the investment directly or
indirectly will turn on a number of factors, one of which in-
cludes the probability of veil-piercing.98
191. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1545-46 (noting that, practically speaking,
in order to be classified as a partnership for tax purposes, two of the following
factors must be absent: continuity of life, centralized management, and free
transferability of interests).
192. Both continuity to life and free transferability of interest are central to
the venture capitalist's desire to sell and exit its investment at the appropriate
time.
193. Currently, the California State Board of Equalization and the Internal
Revenue Service both allow LLCs to choose partnership taxation with a simple
check in the appropriate box on the tax form. Compare CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §
28.5 (West 1998) (classifying LLCs as partnerships for tax purposes), and Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2003).
194. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 2005).
195. Monitoring costs are costs associated with ensuring that one's agent be-
haves properly. Callison, supra note 57, at 105.
196. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 491 ("The greater the degree of moni-
toring of each investment required, the fewer investments that will be made.").
197. See BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[5].
198. Liability is a concern for venture capitalists. See GLADSTONE, supra
note 147, at 326 (enumerating liability-related questions venture capitalists ask
of lawyers before deciding to invest).
Vol: 451030
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Veil-piercing plays a different role depending on which
type of investment is made. Where investors elect to make
the investment directly, each investment will be a discrete
event (i.e., one investment will be independent of any other
investment made). Where they invest by purchasing through
a venture capital firm, each investment will have at least one
aspect it common: they were all made through a venture capi-
tal firm.
Assuming that the investors intend on being passive in-
vestors, they will be better off by selecting the direct form of
investment. The advantage of direct investing is that each
investment is independent of all others. An investment in
one company cannot destroy an investment in another, and
therefore the investors' diversification strategies remain in-
tact. 99 The disadvantage of direct investing is that the inves-
tors open themselves up to unlimited personal liability if the
veil of one of the companies is pierced. If they remain passive
investors, however, that liability will be of nominal concern. °°
The decision to invest indirectly by partnering in a ven-
ture capital firm, however, draws exactly the opposite con-
cerns. These investors have a drastically lower chance of be-
ing held personally liable,20 ' but have an increased possibility
that, if veil-piercing occurs, one investment will affect all oth-
ers. If one of the companies the venture capitalist invested in
has its veil pierced, the investor's entire contribution into the
venture capital firm may be used to satisfy the liability.
22
Additionally, veil-piercing is theoretically more likely to
occur in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists
tend to invest in non-public companies, 22 a class of businesses
particularly susceptible to veil-piercing.0 4 Also, they often
199. Many of the factors stated in Laya that condition piercing of the veil will
not be present where a shareholder owns stock in multiple companies, but does
not exercise management control. See Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 98-99.
200. Veil-piercing is a concern for passive investors only when they behave
improperly. See id. (listing impermissible shareholder acts that would condition
piercing of the veil).
201. The investors in this case will have protection from the veil of the LLC,
the corporation, or the limited partnership.
202. See Gevurtz, supra note 4, at 252 (speculating on whether a venture
capitalist may be liable for more than its contribution into a company if that
company's veil is pierced).
203. Venture capitalists invest in companies before they go public with the
intention of taking them public. QUINDLEN, supra note 2, at 18.
204. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1047 (stating that veil-piercing does not
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take an active role in the management of their investments, 5
which is a factor courts consider when deciding whether to
pierce the veil.2"
Supporters of veil-piercing may contend that the exis-
tence of the doctrine makes no difference at all to the underly-
ing investors (i.e., the limited partners) of a venture capitalist
firm.2" ' They may point out that the limited partnership
status of most venture capital firms already protects the un-
derlying investors from personal liability and, therefore,
whether the portfolio company offers an additional limited li-
ability shield is inconsequential.2 8
Such reasoning would be wrong. Although the limited
partners in a venture capital firm would not be personally li-
able even if the veil of the portfolio company were pierced, the
shield at the LLC level offers protections different from those
provided by the limited partnership shield.'0 9 The LLC shield
should ensure that the liability of one company cannot de-
stroy the entire fund. The limited partnership's shield does
not cover the firm's assets, it only covers the personal assets
of the limited partners. Presumably, if a venture capital firm
did not have enough liquid assets on hand to satisfy a judg-
ment levied against it through the doctrine of veil-piercing, it
would have to sell off its stake in another company to pay the
judgment.
Investors, thus, have an incentive to make several dis-
crete investments, where no one investment can affect an-
other, instead of a single investment into a venture capital
firm, where one company invested in can destroy the entire
investment.
occur in publicly traded corporations).
205. QUINDLEN, supra note 2, at 18.
206. See Cohen, supra note 186, at 456.
207. If investors are willing to invest so long as unlimited personal liability is
not a possibility, then investors will not be discouraged from joining as a limited
partner in a venture capital firm because unlimited liability is unlikely to be
imposed because passive limited partners are generally immune from liability.
208. Limited partners in a limited partnership are generally only liable to
the extent that they exercise control over the business. Investors who exercise
no such control are generally immune from personal liability. Schwindt, supra
note 57, at 1551.
209. The venture capitalists' concept of having at least one firm achieve
wealth sufficient to offset all the other losses is premised on the assumption
that the venture capitalists' loss due to an unsuccessful company will be limited
to the amount of capital contributed to it.
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B. Policy Considerations in an Ideal LLC Liability System
The incentives created by the doctrine of veil-piercing
may begin to justify abolition of the veil-piercing doctrine, but
abolition should not occur unless an alternate system of li-
ability can be devised which will better serve society's inter-
ests. There are two primary considerations in determining
whether this ideal system of LLC liability exists and is prac-
ticable. First, except in certain circumstances, it is important
that someone be held accountable21 when a tort or breach of
contract occurs. Second, it is important that the aggrieved
party be redressed."'
1. Accountability
Although it is usually important that someone be held
accountable when a loss occurs,"' the removal of the veil-
piercing doctrine does not exculpate all tortfeasors and con-
tract breachers. Indeed, in most circumstances, the exact
same persons will be held accountable whether or not veil-
piercing is an option. ' In other situations, the absence of the
doctrine may allow certain persons to escape liability where
they otherwise would have been held accountable." 4 This dis-
crepancy, however, was seemingly the intent of the legislators
in enacting the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company
Act.2
15
To determine whether abolition of the doctrine from LLC
jurisprudence will alter the makeup of persons who may be
held accountable, it is instructive to analyze the circum-
stances where courts have traditionally pierced the veil.
Courts have generally imposed liability on shareholders (1)
when there has been fraud, (2) when the corporation has
failed to adhere to corporate formalities, (3) when sharehold-
210. See Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary - Insolvent: The Fiduciary
Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479, 519 (2000) (discussing need for accountability to
creditors).
211. 9 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (interm ed.,
Matthew Bender 2002) (1951) ("For every breach of contract, irrespective of its
size or kind, the law will give an immediate remedy.").
212. Accountability is not always necessary. See discussion infra Part
IV.B. .a.
213. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 14.
214. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.l.b-d.
215. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.l.b-d.
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ers have abused the corporate entity by exercising dominant
control, and (4) where the corporation has been inadequately
capitalized. 16
a. Fraudulent and Tortious Acts
At the outset, it is important to note that it is not always
important to ensure that plaintiffs have someone, other than
the LLC itself, to hold accountable. This is true primarily
where the plaintiff had the opportunity to investigate the de-
fendant entity's assets before entering into contractual rela-
tions with it.217 Because LLCs are given the freedom to vary
greatly in structure and form,"8 it is a good practice for all
contract parties to conduct an investigation of the LLC's
structure, assets, and credit worthiness. If, upon examina-
tion, it is suspected that the LLC does not possess assets ade-
quate to satisfy a judgment, the parties are free to walk away
or contractually assign personal liability to the LLC mem-
bers.219 If the contracting party fails to do so, it is fair to deem
that that party assumed the risk that recovery would be lim-
ited to the LLC's assets."
In all other cases (primarily those involving fraudulent or
tortious acts), however, ensuring that culpable parties are
held accountable is of greater importance because it is less
likely that plaintiffs will be able to successfully investigate
the defendant's assets. In cases involving fraud, asset inves-
tigation attempts may be thwarted due to the fact that
fraudulent behavior is based on deception. In tort cases, in-
vestigation of the defendant's assets is difficult because the
plaintiff often does not voluntarily deal with the defendant. 2 '
216. Cohen, supra note 186, at 456.
217. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 502-03 (discussing the propriety of
penalty defaults). This is also the rationale behind the third prong of Laya, 352
S.E.2d at 100.
218. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[4] (noting that the LLC statutes
allow most statutory provisions to be overridden by either the articles or a writ-
ten operating agreement).
219. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(e) (West Supp. 2005) (allowing parties to con-
tractually agree to personal liability).
220. In certain cases it would be unfair to allow a contract party to pierce the
veil and recover money. For example, where the contract party already received
a discounted price in the contract based on the understanding that no personal
guarantee would be available.
221. The torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, negligence, etc. often
involve an unsuspecting victim.
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Accountability is necessary in these circumstances not only
because it gives victims a defendant from which they can seek
relief, but also because it deters future acts of fraud and en-
courages precautionary measures against negligent tortious
acts. Fortunately, even without veil-piercing, accountability
can still be ensured.
If the veil-piercing doctrine is abolished and therefore
unavailable in cases involving fraud or tort, the makeup of
parties who may be held accountable would remain substan-
tially the same.222 This is true in large part because the lim-
ited liability shield does not protect LLC members who are
sued on a theory of direct liability.222 Under California Corpo-
rations Code section 17101, members are held liable for their
personal actions.24 Moreover, victims can hold the LLC itself
accountable if the wrongdoer was acting within his role as the
LLC's agent."' The absence of the doctrine will be felt pri-
marily where a plaintiff seeks to hold a LLC member liable
for a loss he did not directly cause. Excluding non-culpable
parties and restricting plaintiffs to direct and agency liability
is the proper limit of liability, whether the member who
caused the wrongful act is from a member-managed or man-
ager-managed LLC. The proper limit of liability is deter-
mined by balancing two competing social goals. On the one
hand, liability must be imposed on members frequently
enough such that they will be deterred from engaging in care-
free entrepreneuring. On the other, liability should not be
imposed so frequently that members will feel restrained from
performing acts they are legitimately authorized to do.
To justify abolition of the veil-piercing doctrine, in both
the member-managed and manager-managed contexts, an
adequate threat of personal liability must be present to deter
members from misbehaving. In both types of LLCs, an ade-
222. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 14 (arguing that the doctrine of
veil-piercing is unnecessary because the same parties can be held accountable
through direct and enterprise liability). -
223. Id.; § 17101(c) (Liability shield should not "be construed to affect the li-
ability of a member ... (1) to third parties for the member's participation in tor-
tious conduct, or (2) pursuant to the terms of a written guarantee or other con-
tractual obligation entered into by the member.... ."); Schwindt, supra note 57,
at 1548 ("If a member commits a tort while in the course of LLC business, she
may be held personally liable for that tort.").
224. § 17101.
225. See Callison, supra note 57, at 107.
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quate threat exists because members can always be held per-
sonally liable for their own misconduct. '26 Where a fiduciary
duty exists, as in the member-managed context, an added
threat exists: the threat of a second lawsuit.227 In addition to
victim's suit, a suit may be filed by the LLC against a manag-
ing member for breach of fiduciary duty228 if that member
misbehaves and the LLC is held liable.229
The threat of personal liability, however, should not be so
cumbersome so as to prevent members from performing acts
that are within their right. Where the member has not him-
self misbehaved, the member should not be held personally
liable. Imposing personal liability for other members' actions
would cause members to act in a risk-averse manner.231 Of-
ten, acting in a risk-adverse manner is contrary to the com-
pany's best interests since businesses often need to take bold
risks to grow. This may be especially true for small busi-
nesses 31-the very business the LLC was intended to help. 2
One final matter must be addressed regarding the proper
limit of accountability and the encouragement of investors.
Bainbridge contends that the proper balance between encour-
aging investors and preventing corporate abuse can be struck
by utilizing the theory of enterprise liability.233 Enterprise li-
ability, Bainbridge explains, is similar to veil-piercing liabil-
226. § 17101(c).
227. Compare § 17150 (stating that members in a member-managed LLC
have the same obligations as managers in a manager-managed LLC), and §
17153 (stating that managers have a fiduciary duty). Although managers in
manager-managed LLCs also owe fiduciary duties and face the threat of a sec-
ond lawsuit, the non-managing members do not owe such duties and, thus, will
not be subject to the deterrent effect of a possible second lawsuit.
228. § 17153 ("The fiduciary duties a manager owes to the limited liability
company and to its members are those of a partner to a partnership and to the
partners of the partnership.").
229. 67 WALTER C. TUTHILL ET AL., LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: LEGAL
ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION, OPERATION, AND DISSOLUTION A-25, A-26 (Bureau
of Nat'l Affairs ed. 1999) (distinguishing members and managers' liability to
third parties from their liability to the LLC and stating "to the extent that the
[operating] agreement sets forth fiduciary or other duties for members or man-
agers,... members and managers may be liable to the LLC and its members for
breach of such duties and standards").
230. Cohen, supra note 186, at 439.
231. Small businesses often have to take greater risks to compensate for
their inability to provide the reputation and stability that larger businesses can
often provide.
232. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 900.02[5].
233. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 528-29.
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ity in that it allows plaintiffs to hold a parent corporation li-
able for the acts of a subsidiary corporation when the two
corporations are improperly treated as one enterprise.234 In-
deed, the entire enterprise can be held liable for each others'
acts.235 This liability is unlike veil-piercing liability, however,
in that the individual investor who owns the entire enterprise
cannot be held personally liable.236 The investor is protected
because he is a natural person and, thus, cannot be part of
the enterprise.37 Bainbridge concludes that this scheme of
direct and enterprise liability creates the proper level of ac-
countability because it allows plaintiffs to recover from inves-
tors' entire investment into the group enterprise, but still lim-
its the investor's liability to his or her original contribution.238
Bainbridge notes that enterprise liability is not the same
as veil-piercing liability, but fails to state that enterprise li-
ability suffers from many, although not all, of the drawbacks
of traditional veil-piercing liability.239 Enterprise liability still
threatens venture capitalists. It allows plaintiffs to recover
from a venture capitalist's entire fund since the venture capi-
tal firm is a limited partnership, and thus can be considered
part of the enterprise. Because the enterprise invests as an
individual investor would, the venture capital firm itself
should be treated as an individual investor and should also be
liable to each investment only to the amount it originally con-
tributed to that single business.4 Enterprise liability, thus,
holds too many parties accountable.24 '
b. Formalities
Both the "failure to comply with formalities" and the "ex-
ercise of dominant control" reasons for piercing the veil are
234. Id. at 531.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 529.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 531. '
239. Bainbridge's proposal draws unwarranted distinctions between owners
who are individuals and owners who are limited liability entities. See Bain-
bridge, supra note 14, at 531. As entities in their own right, even artificial enti-
ties deserve protection.
240. Under Bainbridge's model, individual investors have theit' liability lim-
ited to amount they invested. Id.
241. This type of error punishes innocent conduct, which can cause investors
to behave in a risk-averse manner.
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not transferable to LLC jurisprudence,"' and therefore mem-
bers need not be held accountable on these rationales.
Under California Corporations Code section 17101(b),
LLCs need not comply with certain formalities.243 Thus, the
requirement of adherence to corporate formalities cannot be
directly transferred to LLC law.
244
c. The Exercise of Dominant Control
Whether LLC members exercising dominant control
should be a reason to hold them accountable requires a
deeper analysis.
In the corporate law context, the dominant control factor
has been one of the most determinative in courts' decisions on
whether to pierce the veil.2 45 The importance of this factor
relative to others can be demonstrated with the statistics
gathered in Professor Thompson's study.2 46 Prior to the study,
many analysts believed that whether a plaintiff had an op-
portunity to investigate a corporate defendant's assets, and
whether a plaintiff voluntarily formed a relationship with a
corporate defendant, would be two factors courts would weigh
heavily when deciding whether the corporate veil should be
pierced.247 Accordingly, these analysts believed tort claimants
had a greater claim to piercing than claimants who alleged
breach of contract.2 41 Contract claimants could have chosen
not to transact with the corporation and had a greater oppor-
tunity to evaluate its assets.249
Thompson's study, however, found that courts have dis-
regarded Laya's third prong of analysis and have pierced the
250veil more readily in breach of contract cases than in tort.This finding suggests that the determinative factors in veil-
242. Cohen, supra note 186, at 456. LLC law, unlike corporate law, permits
members to act on behalf of the business, and also does not require members to
observe certain formalities. Id.
243. CAL. CORP..CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 2005).
244. See Cohen, supra note 186, at 456-57.
245. Id. at 456:,
246. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1063-64.
247. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1563-65.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1564; Thompson, supra note 73, at 1059.
250. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1058. Contract cases are pierced in 42% of
inquires while tort cases are only pierced in 31%. Id. Thus, the importance
Laya places on the plaintiffs ability to inquire into the defendant's assets is not
compelling to the courts.
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piercing cases are those relevant to defendant's conduct, not
the victim's.251 Thus, one can conclude that shareholders are
normally protected by virtue of their being passive, and not
because of anything the plaintiff did or did not do.
Although the actions of corporate shareholders may
weigh heavily on courts' decisions of whether the shareholder
should be held personally liable, the "exercise of dominant
control" factor should often be immaterial in determining
whether an LLC member should be held personally liable.
Proponents of veil-piercing have compared LLC members'
poorly made decisions with shareholder decisions that war-
rant piercing of the corporate veil. 52 At least in the member-
managed context, this comparison is unwarranted.
The actions of members cannot be compared to those of
shareholders. While shareholders are prohibited from exer-
cising control over the corporation,25 LLC members in a
member-managed LLC are given statutory authority to le-
gally bind the LLC.2 Arguably, it is not the active nature of
managing shareholders that condition their liability, it is the
unauthorized nature of that management. 5 In corporations,
liability reaches the assets of shareholders only when they
exercise control over the corporation.256 Since shareholders
are not vested with management rights,257 they are held re-
sponsible for the harm caused by their disobedience. There
can be no such disobedience in the LLC context, where mem-
251. Four of the most frequently cited factors during piercing are: fraud, fail-
ure to adhere to formalities, exercise of control by shareholders and inadequate
capitalization-all of which focus on the defendant. Cohen, supra note 186, at
456.
252. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1559 ("Member management can be analo-
gized to shareholders who serve as directors in a corporation.").
253. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1990) ("[A]U corporate powers shall be ex-
ercised by or under the direction of the board.").
254. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 2005) ("[Tlhe business and affairs
of a limited liability company shall be managed by the members ....").
255. Because piercing always occurs in the corporate context when two fac-
tors are present (shareholders exercising control and that control being unau-
thorized), it is difficult to determine which factor motivates the court in its de-
termination. In the LLC context, both factors need not be present
simultaneously since the exercise of control is permitted by statute.
256. In cases where courts have chosen to pierce the corporate veil, the de-
fendant was using the corporation as an alter ego approximately 96% of the
cases. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1063.
257. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1990).
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bers are permitted to act on behalf of the entity.28 Thus, ap-
plication of the doctrine is inappropriate.259 To hold members
liable for their actions would make the limited liability prom-
ise empty." °
In manager-managed LLCs, members should not exercise
dominant control. Where a member does, he should be held
accountable for his actions. In this circumstance, the member
can be held accountable under the theory of direct liability.
d. Inadequate Capitalization
Inadequate capitalization under the current liability
scheme cannot be a basis for liability because the Beverly-
Killea LLC Act allows LLCs to be formed without any current
capital. 61 Unless this allowance is changed, members should
not be held liable because the LLC is undercapitalized.
Besides serving as a factor in the determination of the
proper parties to be held accountable, the inadequate capi-
talization factor is closely linked with the issue of ensuring
that victimized parties will be adequately redressed.
2. Redressability
For a class of business entities to succeed in a world that
is dependent on contracts, it must be able to provide enough
assurance such that other businesses will feel secure con-
258. Members are managers unless elected otherwise under section 17151
and, therefore, are permitted to participate in the LLC's affairs. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 2005). Even in a manager-managed situation, ratifi-
cation functions can be retained by the members. § 17151; Callison, supra note
57, at 112. Unlike shareholders, LLC members in a manager-managed LLC can
require their consent before certain actions are taken. Such actions include the
sale of assets, incurrence of debt, and setting of management compensation.
Callison, supra note 57, at 112.
259. Not only is application inappropriate, but arguably also anomalous. The
parallel between LLC members and shareholders ends with the vestment of
management rights. These rights are also the predicate for imposition of veil-
piercing liability. In the member-managed structure, there is no LLC counter-
part to the shareholder who acts without warrant. In that case, application of
the alter ego doctrine is nearly impossible. In manager-managed LLCs, the doc-
trine may apply where the member acts beyond his powers. Nevertheless, a di-
luted application of the doctrine would be appropriate since members have more
managerial rights than shareholders.
260. Cohen, supra note 186, at 457.
261. In discussing members' capital contribution requirements, CAL. CORP.
CODE § 17200(a) (West Supp. 2005), uses permissive, not mandatory language.
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tracting with it.262 Such assurance occurs when the contract-
ing partner knows not only that someone will be held ac-
countable in event of a breach, but also that its loss will be
redressed. 63
The doctrine of veil-piercing in the corporate setting is
argued when the defendant corporation has insufficient as-
sets to satisfy a judgment levied against it.264 Where no direct
liability against a member or manager is possible and only
the LLC entity itself is held liable, it is imperative that the
LLC remain adequately capitalized at all times so that re-
dress is guaranteed.265 Not surprisingly, adequate capitaliza-
tion is a major factor courts consider when piercing the corpo-
rate veil.266
Under the Beverly-Killea LLC Act, adequate capitaliza-
tion is far from assured. Unlike the statute for corpora-
tions, 67 section 17200(a) allows membership interests in an
LLC to be issued without any capital contribution.2" Al-
though basic contract law requires some consideration be paid
before the member's rights become enforceable, 269 any amount
is generally sufficient,270 even if it falls short of an amount
necessary to redress tort victims and parties injured by a
LLC's breach of contract. Once the LLC has been adequately
capitalized it is important that the LLC maintains assets in
an amount that can cover any losses it causes so that parties
can be redressed.
262. An exception to this proposition is businesses willing to take greater
risks for larger rewards. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1039-40 (discussing risk-
bearers who lend credit for a higher fee).
263. For this reason, many businesses require their contract parties to show
proof of insurance.
264. Where a corporation has assets sufficient to satisfy judgments levied
against it, plaintiffs have no need to pursue veil-piercing.
265. 9 CORBIN, supra note 211, § 946 ("For every breach of contract, irrespec-
tive of its size or kind, the law will give an immediate remedy.").
266. Adequate capitalization is a factor in 73% of all piercings. Thompson,
supra note 73, at 1064.
267. California Corporation Code section 409 requires actual receipt of capi-
tal for issuance of corporate stock. CAL. CORP. CODE § 409 (West 1990).
268. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17200(a) (West Supp. 2005). The language is permis-
sive. MARSH ETAL., supra note 97, § 3.05[D] [1] [a].
269. A contract requires valid consideration to be enforceable. 2 JOSEPH M.
PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.2 (rev.
ed. 1995).
270. The requirement for consideration in forming a contract can be satisfied
by a nominal sum so long as the amount was bargained for. Id. § 5.17.
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In certain situations, monitoring the maintenance of ade-
quate funds becomes administratively too difficult,271 or the
amount at risk becomes so high that society's interests are
best guaranteed by more than an entity's assets or by a per-
sonal liability guarantee.272 Often, this latter problem does
not affect LLCs because several of the businesses which are
more prone to lawsuits or which deal with large sums of
money have been statutorily prohibited from organizing as
LLC entities. 73
V. PROPOSAL
Importing the common law veil-piercing doctrine from
corporate law into LLC law saves judges and law practitio-
ners from the uncertainty of wondering if and how veil-
piercing will play a part in member or manager liability. Al-
though that justification is laudable, the same goals of veil-
piercing can be achieved through an alternative method that
is both true to the limited liability concept and consistent
with California's interests.274
Rather than including the veil-piercing doctrine within
the LLC statute, the doctrine should be eliminated. Third
party interests can and should be protected through adequate
capitalization of the LLC and the direct liability of those di-
rectly responsible for the loss. Tort victims and contract
breachees should look toward the LLC entity for accountabil-
ity and redress for the LLC's actions. If a member acted
without authorization in a manner that caused loss, then the
plaintiff can look to that member and impose liability di-
rectly, not through the veil-piercing doctrine.275
Adequate capitalization can be monitored by the Secre-
tary of State when the LLC organizer files the articles of or-
271. The medical profession exemplifies a field where it is too difficult to
monitor "adequate" funds. The amount that is "adequate" varies doctor by doc-
tor and it is inherently difficult to associate a value with medical malpractice.
272. Some businesses, such as banks, deal with sums of money that shift so
frequently it is difficult to monitor what constitutes an "adequate" amount.
273. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17002, 17375 (West Supp. 2005).
274. California sought to encourage the growth of small businesses with the
enactment of the Beverly-Killea LLC Act. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, §
900.02[5].
275. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1548 (stating the LLC form does not allow
members to escape their personal conduct).
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ganization.278 Section 17200 of the Beverly-Killea LLC Act
can be amended to require the aggregate of members to sat-
isfy minimum contribution amounts that will guarantee satis-
faction of any liabilities that may potentially accrue to busi-
nesses in the applicant's industry. Moreover, that section can
be amended to require the organizer to submit a plan by
which the aggregate of the members will make additional
commitments into the LLC capital as the business grows and
the potentiality of greater liabilities increases.2 7  The contri-
bution can be a withheld portion of the member's financial re-
turn or a promise to make additional payments. The re-
quirement of adequate initial capitalization is already a
corporate requirement, but the requirement of future contri-
butions is an easy addition unique to LLC law because it can
be enforced alongside the existing LLC provision that allows
the investor to gain membership interest by contributing fu-
ture services (or capital).2 78 This addition is simply an imple-
mentation of an existing LLC provision that allows members
to make contributions contingent on the occurrence of a speci-
fied event.79  Under this recommendation, the contingency is
the growth of the LLC. Contingent contributions cannot be
recovered by third parties if the specified event fails to oc-
280
cur.
This system can ensure redress to victims of a LLC's
wrongdoings. Promises to contribute capital are binding on
the member and can be enforced by third parties against the
member's personal assets if the LLC's assets are insuffi-
cient. 28' Although the proposal to hold members personally
responsible for commitments to capitalize when loss beyond
the company's assets occurs may sound like a restatement of
the current veil-piercing doctrine, it differs because it is actu-
ally a subset of the liability that could be imposed under the
current system. The liability would only be for a well-defined
(i.e., limited) amount and may be called upon in only well-
276. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17050 (West Supp. 2005).
277. Provisions for additional contributions are authorized under the current
code, but the use of such agreements is permissive, not mandatory. Id. § 17200.
A formula to calculate the exact amount of future contributions requires eco-
nomic considerations beyond the scope of this comment.
278. Id.
279. MARSH ETAL., supra note 97, § 3.05[D][1][d].
280. § 17201(c).
281. Creditors have the right to enforce commitments under section 17201.
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defined circumstances.
The policy behind this system is in line with California's
interests. First, this system redresses victims for their losses
and holds the proper party accountable. Where venture-
backed companies are held liable, redress is particularly
likely because the amount necessary to make the victim
whole will likely fall within the company's net worth.282 Sec-
ond, the at-fault party is liable for the proper amount and
thus, investments are not discouraged. If unlimited personal
liability were a possibility for members whenever LLCs incur
liability, this factor would discourage investors from funding
businesses that are vital to California's economy. Third, the
system brings predictability into the liability scheme. The
uncertainty of liability is especially true in the corporate con-
text where the factors that prompt courts to pierce are par-
ticularly nebulous.283
VI. CONCLUSION
California courts have been using the judicial doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil since 192 1.2' The veil-piercing
doctrine began as an exception to the rule, but has since
taken a life of its own and has become the most litigated issue
in corporate law.285 It has been argued in cases where it has
no place, yet it has been embodied in LLC law by the Beverly-
Killea LLC Act. 86 Despite the attributes that corporations
and LLCs share, the doctrine of veil-piercing has no place in
LLC law because the entities differ and interests in California
are best served by preserving the limited liability nature of
LLCs. By protecting society's well-being against an LLC's
misconduct through adequate capitalization, California can
create a more stable body of law that is both predictable and
reliable. These characteristics foster the funding of Califor-
nia businesses through venture capital funds. California has
progressed greatly by encouraging venture-backed companies.
282. Recent venture capitalist commitments have exceeded the average
awards in tort cases. According to a 1999 study, median compensatory damages
were $50,000 and median punitive damages were $200,000. See Ted Rohrlich,
We Aren't Seeing You in Court, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al, A17.
283. Schwindt, supra note 57, at 1556.
284. Minifie v. Rowley, 202 P. 673, 676 (Cal. 1921).
285. Thompson, supra note 73, at 1036.
286. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 2005).
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That progress can be continued without injury to the safety of
society, but for it to do so, the California legislature must put
to rest the doctrine of LLC veil-piercing and allow the LLC to
truly take on a limited liability status.

